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SURVEYING THE DAMAGE:
A STUDY OF DAMAGES PAYOUTS BY THE DELHI
HIGH COURT IN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
CASES (2005-2014)
Eashan Ghosh*
ABSTRACT
A comprehensive ten year study of damages awarded by the Delhi High
Court in trademark infringement cases reveals the remarkable extent
to which the quantum of damages can be correlated to the presence of
certain factual criteria. It brings into sharp focus exactly how far the
reasoning behind awarding and quantifying damages – often the biggest
takeaway and most powerful deterrent in trademark infringement cases
– has been rendered an afterthought. Commencing with a critical
commentary on the headline damages payouts by the Delhi High Court
in 1, I break down the significant statistical outcomes of damages awarded
based on key criteria, including aggravating and mitigating factors
considered and litigant profile, in 2. I then employ these findings in 3 as
the basis for a proposed basic minimum checklist for quantifying damages
in such cases going forward – an area where judicial reasoning has been
strikingly and disappointingly thin in the past decade.

1

THE HEADLINE DAMAGES PAYOUTS IN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASES
BY THE DELHI HIGH COURT

The early history of damages in trademark infringement cases was marked more
by the range of justifications offered for sustaining a damages payout rather than
the adherence to any one individual reason. Most notably, infringement by
*
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defendants amounting to fraud on the public,1 calculated to increase the likelihood
of deception,2 the presence or absence of bona fide use3 or other bona fide conduct
by the defendants4 were all employed by the Delhi High Court in the early decades
as markers for attracting damages.
These markers quickly expanded over the first few years of this century to
incorporate most aspects of infringing defendants’ conduct, even though the explicit
correlation of these factors to damages payouts was largely non-existent.

1.1 TIME INC
Despite the prevalence of several fairly well-reasoned contemporaneous alternatives,5
Time Inc6 has become the equivalent of the Big Bang in the modern Indian law on
damages in trademark infringement cases – the agreed-upon starting point to which
practically all significant damages awards over the last decade have traced their
antecedents. This ubiquitous nature of Time Inc over the following decade makes
it a convenient and accurate starting point for the present paper. The cases considered
in this paper are limited to final judgements by the Delhi High Court – another
largely straightforward qualification, given this Court’s virtual stranglehold on
cases discussing and awarding damages for trademark infringement following Time
Inc7 and the lack of reliable public information on out-of-court settlement amounts
in such cases. The ten year time period is long enough to provide substantial case
coverage while still maintaining comparability in terms of preserving the money
value8 of damages awarded by Courts at the beginning and the end of this time period.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

Wearwell 5 (1969) DLT 469.
Prina Chemical Works (1974) ILR 1 Del 545; Century Traders AIR 1978 Del 250.
Amar Soap 1985 (5) PTC 85 (Del); Hindustan Pencils AIR 1990 Del 19; Ciba-Geigy 1998 (18)
PTC 545 (Del).
Walter Bushnell 1999 (19) PTC 667 (Del).
See Adidas-Salomon 2005 (30) PTC 308 (Del), NASSCOM 2005 (30) PTC 437 (Del), Microsoft
2005 (30) PTC 245 (Del), Cartier CS(OS) 1208/2003 (22.07.2005), Scotch Whisky Association
2006 (32) PTC 656 (Del), all of which resulted in hefty damages payouts against infringing defendants.
2005 (30) PTC 3 (Del).
Honourable mention must, however, be made of a clutch of recent Bombay judgements by
Justice Kathawalla, awarding damages after returning findings on deceptive similarity. See
Arviva 2013 (54) PTC 199 (Bom), Asian Paints 2013 (54) PTC 433 (Bom), Lupin 2014 (2)
ABR 325, 2014 (2) ABR 326 and Biochem 2014 (3) ABR 54.
All numerical references to damages payouts hereinafter are in INR (Lakhs/100,000), denoted
by ‘L’. The US Dollar exchange rate at the time of final judgement in Time Inc was around
US$1:INR 43.5, which has since shifted to around US$1:INR 63.5, as of December 2014,
which is the time period of the most recent judgement considered in this paper.
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A reasonably straightforward deceptive similarity finding crystallized by a 5L9
damages award, Time Inc stands out primarily for its exploration of the theories
behind awarding damages. Discussing compensatory and punitive damages in detail,
the judgement attracts little argument insofar as it identifies the essentially restitutive
nature of the former and the essentially penal/deterrent intention behind the latter,
openly targeting the financial viability of trademark defendants for the first time.10
Bizarrely, though, Justice Chopra relied heavily on the 2003 US Court of Appeals
decision in Mathias. Mathias affirmed a jury award of punitive damages against an
American motel company in a civil negligence claim based on the motel’s failure to
prevent them from being bitten by bedbugs in US$100+ per-night rooms. The
decision is conspicuous by its rather left-field inclusion in an Indian trademark
case and the passage relied upon in Time Inc is worth quoting in full (italics mine):
“When punitive damages are sought for billion-dollar oil spills and
other huge economic injuries, the considerations that we have just
canvassed fade. As the Court emphasized in Campbell, the fact that
the plaintiffs in that case had been awarded very substantial
compensatory damages — $1 million for a dispute over insurance
coverage — greatly reduced the need for giving them a huge award of
punitive damages ($145 million) as well in order to provide an effective
remedy. Our case is closer to the spitting case. The defendant’s behavior
was outrageous but the compensable harm done was slight and at the
same time difficult to quantify because a large element of it was
emotional. And the defendant may well have profited from its
misconduct because by concealing the infestation it was able to keep
renting rooms. Refunds were frequent but may have cost less than
the cost of closing the hotel for a thorough fumigation. The hotel’s
attempt to pass off the bedbugs as ticks, which some guests might
ignorantly have thought less unhealthful, may have postponed the
instituting of litigation to rectify the hotel’s misconduct. The award
of punitive damages in this case thus serves the additional purpose of
limiting the defendant’s ability to profit from its fraud by escaping
9
10

INR Five Lakhs or 500,000; see note 4, supra.
Supra note 6, at 7, 8.
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detection and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half
the time he commits torts, then when he is caught he should be punished
twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away.”11
To use this passage as authority for the view that a trademark defendant should
be punished “twice as heavily in order to make up for the times he gets away”12
because “it is very difficult for a plaintiff to give proof of actual damages suffered…as
the defendants who indulge in such activities never maintain proper accounts of
their transactions [which] they know…are objectionable and unlawful”13 is as
ingenious as it is reductive. It offers an extremely thin trademark-specific
justification for punitive damages – indeed, it suggests that the role of punitive
damages is to plug gaps that compensatory damages cannot by, in a sense,
overcompensating plaintiffs with punitive largesse that is merited on account of
financially disorganized defendants. Further, it cripplingly and unfairly caricatures
all defendants in trademark infringement suits as unprofessional small traders who
knowingly violate trademark law and, equally harmfully, offers plaintiffs no basis
to claim proportionally higher damages against bigger defendants based on their
scale of business.
The Court’s gung ho affirmation that its punitive damages award was restricted to
“only” 5L because the Plaintiff limited itself to such amount made headlines while
the pegging of punitive damages to the flagrancy of the infringement – perhaps the
only trademark-exclusive metric in the entire judgement – slipped almost furtively
into precedent.

1.2 HERO HONDA
Time Inc was revisited eleven months later in Hero Honda.14 With non-contesting
defendants becoming the rule rather than the exception, Justice Kaul tempered the
vigilantism of Time Inc with a bit of common sense regarding the harm that damages
awards sought to fortify plaintiffs from. As with Mathias, this passage has also
been subsequently misapplied and is worth reproducing in full (italics mine):
11
12
13
14

Mathias 347 F 672 (7th Cir, 2003), at 13.
Supra note 6, at 8.
Supra note 6, at 8.
Hero Honda 2006 (32) PTC 117 (Del).
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“I am in agreement with the [submission] that damages in such cases
must be awarded and a defendant, who chooses to stay away from the
proceedings of the Court, should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits
of evasion of court proceedings. Any view to the contrary would
result in a situation where the defendant who appears in court and
submits its account books would be liable for damages, while a party
which chooses to stay away from court proceedings would escape the
liability on account of failure of the availability of account books. A
party who chooses to not participate in court proceedings and stay
away must, thus, suffer the consequences of damages as stated and set
out by the plaintiff. Of course, this would not imply that the plaintiff
would be entitled to any figure quoted by it, which may be astronomical.
The figure of Rs. 5 lakhs as damages can hardly be said to be astronomical
keeping in mind the nature of deception alleged by the plaintiff which
not only causes direct loss to the plaintiff, but also affects the reputation
of the plaintiff by selling sub-standard goods in the market where the
public may be deceived in buying the goods thinking the same to be that
of the plaintiff. There is a larger public purpose involved to discourage
such parties from indulging in such acts of deception and, thus, even
if the same has a punitive element, it must be granted. [Justice Chopra]
has very succinctly set out in [Time Inc] that punitive damages are
founded on the philosophy of corrective justice. That was the case
where the publishers of Time Magazine had come to court and one of
the factors which weighed while awarding punitive damages was that
the readers had been sufferers of the infringement of the mark of the
plaintiff. The only difference is that in the present case it is the consumer
of the products of the plaintiff, who have suffered as a consequence of the
infringement of the mark and logo of the plaintiff by the defendant.”15

The logic for punishing non-contesting defendants, while understandable from a
rudimentary equity perspective, is itchily contradictory, given the problem
identified. Surely it stands to reason that punishing contesting but infringing
defendants ought to be a bigger priority than imposing damages on non-contesting

15

Ibid, at 18.
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and frequently untraceable fly-by-night infringers for whom such damages are no
more than symbolic. Nevertheless, Hero Honda stands out for laying down a
veritable stream of relevant factors to aid in the damages inquiry – quantifiable
losses to plaintiffs, effects on plaintiffs’ reputation, the similarity of the marks and
the likelihood of confusion and overall effects on consumers primary among them.
The Hero Honda passage has been quoted increasingly frequently to support
damages awards as defendant absenteeism continues to grow. Shockingly, though,
the italicized parts, where Justice Kaul’s real contribution shines through, have
been progressively sawed off,16 gifting plaintiffs nothing less than a hunting license
for plaintiffs to line up ex parte defendants with damages awards in their pockets.
Microsoft,17 The Polo/Lauren Co,18 KeePharma,19 Cadila Healthcare, 20 Pfizer, 21
Jockey,22 Pepsi,23 Disney,24Atlantic Industries25 and Nestlé 26 have all benefited from
this alarming revisionism in recent years.

1.3 THE BIG PAYOUT TRILOGY: MICROSOFT, LACHHMAN DAS AND RECKITT
BENCKISER
By July 2007, Delhi’s judicial patience with non-contesting defendants had reached
a breaking point. The release came in the form of Justice Sistani’s hard-hitting 20L
damages award in Microsoft.27Three things stand out about the judgement. First, it
demonstrated that non-contesting defendants were not just anomalies who could
be made examples of a laTime Inc– it was clearly becoming “a trend”28 to the point
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

A process ironically commenced by Justice Kaul himself in The Heels CS(OS) 1385/2005
(29.03.2006) and recognised recently by Justice Singh while imposing a 5.2L award against
small-time counterfeiters in Cisco 2014 (59) PTC 356 (Del), at 23.3, 24.
Microsoft 2007 (35) PTC 415 (Del).
The Polo/Lauren Co CS(OS) 163/2005 (19.12.2011).
Kee Pharma 2012 (50) PTC 501 (Del).
Cadila Healthcare 2014 (58) PTC 650 (Del).
Pfizer 2014 (59) PTC 537 (Del).
Jockey 2014 (59) PTC 437 (Del).
Pepsi 2014 (59) PTC 275 (Del).
Disney 2014 (59) PTC 217 (Del).
Atlantic Industries MIPR 2014 (2) 344.
Nestle AIR 2014 Del 156.
Microsoft 2008 (36) PTC 697 (Del).
Ibid, at 22.
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that it was becoming “a systematic attempt to jettison the relief sought by the
plaintiff”,29 something that the judiciary was getting extremely worried about.
Second, it painted punitive damages as the judicial equivalent of breaking the
emergency glass while deftly burying the act of avoidance of judicial proceedings
by defendants under an avalanche of contemptuous language, imputing everything
from flagrancy of conduct to reckless shenanigans.30 Third, it marked a significant
improvement on Time Inc in terms of relying on international precedent supporting
punitive damages awards in intellectual property cases, though even this remained
more an ersatz list of cases31 with corresponding damages awards than engagement
with substantive legal standards of any description.
However, the eventual calculation of damages was a simple estimate of the total
revenue generated by the defendants, arrived at by a crude ‘number of infringing
units sold multiplied by price per unit’ formula. This resulted in a gross estimate
of 127.8L, which had to be capped at 20L, since that was the extent of the plaintiff’s
claim.
September 2007’s Lachhman Das 32 did little to contribute to trademark
jurisprudence on damages but returned an award two-and-a-half times higher –
50L plus costs, payable at 9% interest – but based on a calculation that was no
more sophisticated than Microsoft. Justice Ahmed drew a straight line between a
drop in sales of the plaintiff and the amount of damages they were entitled to,
reasoning that “it may well be that had the activities of the defendants [doing
business under a trademark identical to the plaintiff’s] not taken place, the increase
in the sales [of the plaintiff] might have been more but there is no conclusive
evidence as to the exact quantum of the loss that has been caused to the plaintiff.
There is ample evidence however of the fact that loss had been caused to the plaintiff
by the defendants.”33
Even setting aside the difficulties involved in projecting plaintiff’s business revenue
independent of its competitors, it is surely fallacious in the extreme to impute all
29
30
31
32
33

Supra note 27, at 22.
Supra note 27, at 22.
This, of course, included the now-obligatory reference to Mathias, continuing judges’ inexplicable
fascination with the passage quoted at 1.1 above.
Lachhman Das 2007 (35) PTC 693 (Del).
Ibid, at 5.
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losses suffered by the plaintiff to the defendant’s activities, especially given the
admitted lack of evidence led by the plaintiff on losses it suffered. The final figure
of 50L (split into 25L each for compensatory and punitive damages) – a compromise
between the plaintiff’s supposedly demonstrated losses of 100L and its suit claim
of 20L – is equally mystifying, based possibly on the recognition that the plaintiff
was entitled to more than its original claim of 20L but not to the extent that it
later claimed on affidavit.34 No reasons whatsoever were forthcoming on why the
damages award was not capped by the plaintiff’s claim of 20L nor was there any
explanation for why punitive damages were deemed appropriate.
The January 2014 decision in Hindustan Unilever35 revisited some of these issues,
though in the context of product disparagement. The conclusion of the Division
Bench, enhancing to 25.7L a 5L damages award challenged in appeal for product
disparagement through an advertisement by a competitor, was based primarily on
the deliberate nature of the defendant’s actions. The decision involves some excellent
discussion of factors such as the effects of repeated infringement via publication/
airing and the defendant’s overall conduct but transfers disappointingly little into
an actual calculation of damages.

1.4 ARDATH TOBACCO AND PHILIP MORRIS
Standing somewhat forlornly against this line of big payouts is Ardath Tobacco.36
It articulates a succinct set of factual circumstances – the small scale of the defendants’
roadside vending business, the absence of any accounting records or storage space
where infringing material could be stored, miniscule sales (and thus, presumably,
correspondingly minor actual losses caused) when compared with the plaintiffs –
to support the conclusion that not only was a heavy damages award not merited
but it would also have been meaningless in an enforcement sense given the inability
of the defendants to pay such amounts. Two similarly small payoffs to Philip
Morris in March 201437 raise hopes that this approach to small infringers could
prevail in the long term.
34
35
36
37

Supra note 32, at 6.
Hindustan Unilever 2014 (57) PTC 495 (Del).
Ardath Tobacco 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del).
Philip Morris 2014 (58) PTC 317 (Del), 209 (2014) DLT 1.
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2. KEY STATISTICAL TAKEAWAYS
HIGH COURT

FROM

DAMAGES PAYOUTS

BY THE

DELHI

2.1 AVERAGE DAMAGES AWARDED AND OTHER REMEDIES
The overall average payout in all trademark infringement cases proceeding to full
judgement where damages have been awarded in the time period in question is
about 5.9L. However, it is notable that in 6% of all cases, despite showing an
inclination to do so, courts have awarded no damages whatsoever on account of
plaintiffs’ failure to demonstrate a basis for the claim for damages. Taking into
account these cases where plaintiffs have failed to make the threshold for claiming
damages, the overall average dips to 5.6L.
To be sure, the three slightly outré awards discussed in 1.3 above deserve to be redflagged here – as such, they are highly unlikely to feature in such calculations
going forward and ought to be disentangled from the vast majority of cases included
in the study. Eliminating these three awards, the average corrects to a much more
representative 5.2L (and further to 5.08L, taking into account the 6% of empty
awards).
Moving to allied awards, costs of the proceedings have been awarded to successful
plaintiffs in 51% of such cases overall. However, in only one-fifth of these cases
have costs been quantified in the judgement itself, while almost none of these
judgements seek to explain the thinking behind the quantum of costs awarded. A
further 7.2% of cases have explicitly made the damages award payable within a
specified time period and/or with penal interest and a small fraction of cases (3.8%)
have even separately quantified awarded legal fees.

2.2 EX PARTE AWARDS
Another striking feature is that an overwhelming 88% of these cases were decided
entirely ex parte, with the damages payout to plaintiffs in fully contested proceedings
shrinking to 1.7L. This adds statistical ammunition to questioning the logic that
non-contesting defendants should be punished more severely, since it is evidently
a dangerous evasion of priorities if it has the consequence of not punishing those
defendants who do put in appearances.
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This reticence in punishing contesting defendants could be possibly be partly
explained by lingering doubts over the get-out clause provided by Section 135(3)
of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Sections 135(3)(b) and 135(3)(c), in trademark
infringement and passing off cases respectively, provide a safe harbour for a
contesting defendant, contingent on the defendant demonstrating that that it was
unaware or had no reasonable ground to believe that the plaintiff was the proprietor
or authorised user of a trademark/registered trademark38 and that it ceased its
own use of the trademark on becoming aware of the plaintiff’s rights in the same.39
In such cases, a minimum expectation would be that the employment or
contemplation of Section 135(3) be backed by some kind of evaluation of whether
the defendant fulfilled the conditions to trigger its applicability. Unfortunately,
this has simply not been the case and instances of judges employing and explaining
Section 135(3) as a mitigating factor in the damages award are extremely rare.40

2.3 AGGRAVATING, MITIGATING AND NEUTRAL FACTORS IN DAMAGES AWARDS
The standout finding in this specific sub-section is that cases involving infringement
findings on deceptively similar marks (as opposed to identical marks), which account
for about one-fourth of all damages awards, result in an average payout of only
2.8L, which is a hugely significant 44% lower than the overall average.
Other, more foreseeable aggravating factors include contempt by defendants of ex
parte injunction orders (where the average award spikes to 7.2L, +41% above the
overall average), using infringing trademarks on counterfeit products (6.6L, +30%)
and copying of well-known acronyms in the same class of products (6.7L, +33%).41
Conversely, several mitigating factors also stand out. These include use of the
same or similar trademark in relation to a different class of products (where the

38
39
40
41

S. 135(3)(c)(i), and S. 135(3)(b)(i), Trade Marks Act, 1999.
S. 135(3)(c)(ii) and S. 135(3)(b)(ii), Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Nestlé 2009 (39) PTC 129 (Del); J&P Coats2014 (59) PTC 175 (Del).
Another aggravating factor recently recognised by Courts, though not yet conclusively
correlatable with damages payouts, has been the defendant’s priors in terms of trademark
squatting, filing trademarks with false use claims and other mala fide acts. See Justice Sistani’s
5L award in Forme Communications 2014 (59) PTC 518 (Del), at 34, Justice Singh’s 8.5L
award in Rolex 2014 (60) PTC 131 (Del), at 47.
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average award reduces to 3.03L, -40% below the overall average),42 copying of
numerals (2.8L, -43%) and domain name infringement cases (3.5L, -31%).
Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the damages awards based either
on the extent of preliminary engagement by infringing defendants with the judicial
process after injunction orders. Indeed, suits partially contested at various
preliminary stages (initial appearance, cooperating with investigations/courtappointed Local Commissions, filing a written statement) account for no more
than a 5% swing in the overall average damages payout. Equally remarkably, there
appears to be no discernible difference in the judicial treatment of potentially
public interest-facing disputes such as pharmaceutical products cases, where average
damages awarded are merely +2% off the overall average.

2.4 LITIGANT PROFILES
About one-half of cases proceeding to final judgement and a damages award in the
time period in question have been instituted by Indian plaintiffs and it is telling
that the damages awarded to them on average are a touch under 3.3L per award,
which is a full 35% lower than the damages awarded on an average to foreign
plaintiffs. Further, on most occasions where a foreign plaintiff has been awarded
damages below the overall average, there appears to have been a mitigating factor
close at hand. Thus, judges have inevitably reduced payouts where damages have
not been properly articulated43 or pressed44 or supported by proof45 by plaintiffs,
where the marks have been deceptively similar and not identical,46 where some

42

43
44
45
46

47
48

The reasoning in this sub-classification of cases is often shaky, as demonstrated by Justice
Singh’s 2L punitive damages award despite the admittedly plaintiff proving actual damages in
Sasken Communication 2009 (41) PTC 523 (Del), at 21.
General Electric 2009 (39) PTC 541 (Del); Pfizer 2011 (46) PTC 401 (Del).
Toyota 2011 (45) PTC 465 (Del).
Glaxo 2007 (34) PTC 109 (Del).
Intel 2006 (33) PTC 345 (Del); P&G 2011 (45) PTC 541 (Del); Novartis 2011 (47) PTC 349
(Del); Nestlé 2011 (48) PTC 152 (Del); Smithkline and French CS(OS) 1775/2008 (24.11.2011);
Siemens CS(OS) 1986/2013 (10.11.2014).
Jane Norman MIPR 2014 (2) 363.
L&T 2011 (46) PTC 385 (Del).
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contesting defendants have admitted liability or settled,47 have been out of the
reach of the court48 or operating on such a small scale that losses have been minor.49
This begs the thorny question of whether this considerably lighter trigger in cases
involving foreign plaintiffs is deliberate. It is a question with no clear-cut answer,
and a classic instance of the judiciary being caught between the proverbial legal
rock and policy hard place. Nevertheless, it bears mention that the odd judgement
on the subject has not been shy in openly siding with foreign plaintiffs. Justice
Jain’s March 2011 opinion in Tata (en route to awarding an Indian plaintiff 2L
plus costs in damages)is a case in point:
“Our country is now almost in the league of advanced countries. More and more
foreign companies are entering our markets, with latest products. They would be
discouraged to enter our country to introduce newer products and make substantial
investments here, if the Courts do not grant adequate protection to their intellectual
property rights. […] Most of the products sold by these companies are branded
products, the marks on them having trans-border reputation and enjoying
tremendous brand equity. It is, therefore, becoming increasingly necessary to curb
such trade mark piracies (sic), lest they drive away the huge foreign investment our
country is attracting.”50

3 T OWARDS A J UDICIAL C HECKLIST
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT CASES

FOR

QUANTIFYING D AMAGES

IN

The various approaches followed by the Delhi High Court in the last ten years in
awarding damages have occasionally complicated the task of picking a minimum
49
50
51
52

Philip Morris 2014 (58) PTC 317, 209 (2014) DLT 1.
Tata 2011 (46) PTC 244 (Del), 28.
Most recently, Disney CS(OS) 3466/2012 (20.02.2014).
In the same vein, courts may also look to incorporate, wherever appropriate, the user principle
and the possibility of defendants doing business in non-infringing alternatives. The yardsticks
for these factors were fruitfully explored in Force India [2012] EWHC 616 (Ch) and fine-tuned
in 32Red [2013] EWHC 815 (Ch) to include an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
the parties’ positions in arriving at a fair damages award. See Bonita Trimmer, “A Guide to
Damages Calculations for Trade Mark Infringement”, http://www.managingip.com/Article/
3358604/A-guide-to-damages-calculations-for-trade-mark-infringement.html (last accessed
December 29, 2014) and Walker Morris, “Assessment of Damages in IP Infringement Cases”,
http://www.walkermorris.co.uk/assessment-damages-ip-infringement-cases (last accessed
December 29, 2014).
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consensus path in arriving at such awards but have, in aggregate, covered most
factual considerations that ought to be relevant.
These factors could be usefully refashioned in the form of a basic three question
post-infringement inquiry.
(1)

Where does the infringement fall to be located on the deceptive
similarity continuum?
This could conceivably be worked on a percentage or point scale to judge
how adjacent the rival marks are and how likely they are to cause consumer
confusion.

(2)

What is the estimated annual capacity of the infringer’s business
and how long has the infringer has been in business?
Pressure points in this specific inquiry could be addressed by considering
reliable evidence of adoption and use (ideally, from a legal document such
as a trademark application). In cases where evidence is not forthcoming on
these factors on account of non-contesting defendants, courts should still
require plaintiffs to fulfill minimum evidentiary thresholds by furnishing
market intelligence or expert affidavits on infringers’ business.

(3)

Speaking primarily to the punitive element, is the infringement of a
flagrant or brazen nature?
While a cynical view would suggest that the insistence on the absence of a
flagrant and brazen infringing act means little when the positive standard
is so ambiguously defined, there is precedent51 to suggest that there is
enough meat to this standard to at least merit inclusion in a pot pourri of
factors to be considered in arriving at a damages award.

A percentage value of (1) multiplied by a realistic financial estimate of (2)
compounded by the punitive element embodied by (3) should, at the very least,
offer a useful baseline around which other aggravating and mitigating factors can
be arranged. Potential factors that could populate such an inquiry have, as evident
53

Ellora Industries 1981 PTC 67.
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from 2.3 above, already form a part of the judicial calculus on the quantum of
damages.52
To this, however, it would be remiss not to incorporate – within the punitive
damages assessment at the very least – some consideration of the infringers’ business
profile. More specifically, the centrality of the infringing mark to the infringer’s
overall business and, especially in a counterfeit context, the commercial environment
of the infringer’s business are evidently extremely germane factors.
The potential pitfalls of relying on a plaintiff-driven estimate of losses caused as a
consequence of infringement are evident post-Lachhman Das. Sidestepping a
theoretically taxing but ultimately ancillary debate on the rule of law, it may
fairly be asserted that deterrence is likely to work only where potential infringers
are confronted with a gradient of consequences and to fall back, as so many
judgements have, on the mythical default position that all infringers are deterred
by the law would merely be judicial bluster. Lastly, all such calculations should, of
course, add costs of the suit where plaintiffs claim them through evidence but
overall awards should always be capped by the amount claimed.
This sort of inquiry could possibly be dovetailed with another encouraging, if
slightly antiquated, Delhi High Court practice – using inherent powers to customize
relief to the needs of the case. This could include evolving factors to determine
when defendants are required to submit accounts of profits,53 requiring litigants
to furnish security amounts against injunctive relief54 and setting standards for
whether and to what extent defendants consenting to injunctions should mitigate
relief.55
The possibilities are endless and it is vital to mould these numerous considerations
into a consensus judicial checklist to ensure that the damage done to trademarkdependent businesses on both sides of the litigation divide is fairly, accurately and
swiftly accounted for.

54
55

Mehboob Productions 10 (1974) DLT 299; S Karam Singh 1981 PTC 260.
Rai Toys Industries 1982 PTC 85.

